

### Executive summary

- Trading at multi-year lows, banks are the key driver of the underperformance of the financial sector
- But September highlighted how exposed investors could be to any change in sentiment to rates
- Lower interest rates are potentially undermining the current banking model as margins compress to unsustainable levels
- However, there is much evidence that banks have numerous levers to ensure future returns
- Fears over a recession impacting the banks are understandable, but current assumptions based on the last financial crisis are excessive – we expect a mild deterioration and question the current crisis valuations
- Low interest rates will change the model rather than destroy the banking system
- Expect a shift to arranging/structuring/fee-driven businesses/smaller balance sheets – positive for continued dividends
- Banks offer a geared exposure to interest rates, exceptionally low valuations and high dividend yields

### Banks are the key component of the value trade


For many investors the banking sector is an area best avoided, as evidenced by the multi-year lows against general indices and crisis level valuations on offer (see Chart 1). They are also a driver of the underperformance of value stocks (see Chart 2) since they make up a large proportion of value in the market (Chart 3).

**Chart 1: MSCI World Banks vs MSCI World**




Source: Bloomberg, 26 September 2019.

**Chart 2: S&P 500 P/E spread - Value vs Market**



Source: JP Morgan, 12 September 2019.

**Chart 3: Banks dominate value**




Source: Bloomberg, 26 September 2019. Note: MSCI World <0.5x BV by sector (market cap).


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However, as was illustrated dramatically in September (see Chart 4), their performance could turn materially in the event of a change in interest rate expectations. As a driver of a rerating of value, continuing to ignore them leaves investors exposed, particularly as they remain the largest sub-sector worldwide accounting for 9% of the MSCI All Country World Index.

**Chart 4: When views on rates change?**



**Chart 5: Banks are where you want to be**




**Source:** Bloomberg, 26 September 2019. Note: Data points taken every three minutes from 14:30pm till 20:57pm over the 5, 6 & 9 September.

Banks failure to perform has dragged down returns for the overall financial sector and forced us to shift to specialist areas such as payments, REITs and non-life insurance (all of which banks outperformed during the September rotation to value – see Chart 5). But with bank valuations now at multi-year lows, it is time to take a second look at the banking sector since the gloom seems overdone and our portfolios (**Polar Capital Global Financials Trust – a 58%<sup>1</sup> of which is in banks – and Polar Capital Financial Opportunities Fund – 62%<sup>1</sup>**) have started to shift back.


Investors are avoiding the sector because of two inter-related issues: **lower interest rates and the risk of a recession**, with banks perceived as being in the front line of any negative impact through falling margins and rising loan loss provisions. Furthermore, in an era of low interest rates, with limited benefit from deposit franchises, banks will be disrupted out of existence by new nimbler providers of financial services with lower transaction costs (see our [Financials 2.0](#) note). Many investors can find few catalysts to start investing in the sector although we would argue it simply needs a change in interest rate expectations rather than a dramatic change in industry fundamentals.

**Chart 6: US banks vs US 10 year yield**



**Source:** Bloomberg, 26 September 2019.

**Chart 7: European banks vs 10 year bund yields**



**Source:** Bloomberg, 9 October 2019.


Charts 6 and 7 show the close correlation between US and European banks with rates, although, recently the US banking sector appears to have been more resilient (with the correlation potentially distorted by tax cuts).

<sup>1</sup> Polar Capital, 26 September 2019.


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### Low interest rates do not mean all bank models are doomed

Lower rates are feeding into margin pressure although recent updates from US banks suggest a lower impact than feared, and a consequent rise in analyst expectations (Chart 10). Many investors are simply assuming the experience of Japanese and now European banks will be replicated in the critical US bank sector. This ignores the fact that these banking sectors are structured differently, with US banks not having the drag of low earning, price-sensitive mortgages and large corporate loans on balance sheets which have been disintermediated to capital markets. Bank lending only accounts for approximately 20% of all corporate finance in the US compared to 60% in Europe. Much of US bank on-balance sheet lending is made up of more lucrative and less price-sensitive consumers, real estate and mid/small corporate loans, ie the lending margin could be more resilient than generally assumed (when was the last time you saw a bank cut credit card rates simply because long-term rates have fallen?) with clear evidence in the trend in margins holding up much better in the US during the last downward cycle. Charts 8 and 9 highlight the Armageddon scenario is simply not playing out and guidance from companies' management is not catastrophic.

**Chart 8: US bank net interest margin development**


Source: Barclays, 25 February 2019.

**Chart 9: Bank net interest margins 2010 vs 2019**


Source: Polar Capital, Company Annual Reports 2010 and 2019.

**Chart 10**
**FY19 NII management guidance at 2Q19 results**
**Subsequent impact on FY19 analyst consensus NII**


|                 | FY19 NII management guidance at 2Q19 results | Subsequent impact on FY19 analyst consensus NII |
|-----------------|--|---|
| Wells Fargo     | Upper end of 2%-5% reduction                 | +0.5%   |
| JP Morgan       | Reduced NII from \$58bn to \$57.5bn          | +1.1%   |
| Citigroup       | NII guidance maintained                      | -0.1%   |
| Bank of America | Downgrade from +3% growth to +1%             | +0.3%   |
| US Bancorp      | Mid single digit NIM reduction for 25bps cut | +0.7%   |
| PNC             | No change to guidance                        | -0.9%   |
| KeyCorp         | 100bps cut reduces NII by <1%                | +0.1%   |
| Citizen         | Guidance maintained                          | +0.3%   |

Source: Polar Capital, September 2019.


Negative rates are the key fear and they are clearly a drag on profitability. However, Denmark's experience of a banking system that has functioned with negative rates since 2012 highlights the scale of the impact (Danmarks Nationalbank calculates a cumulative drag of \$590m since 2012, 1.8% of profit) with support from a higher proportion of fee income. Recent announcements by UBS and Jyske Bank regarding the introduction of negative deposit rates (UBS on deposits of >CHF2m, Jyske on all corporate deposits and retail deposits >DKK755,000) also shows a willingness to pass on the costs to customers.

We do accept that low interest rates question the benefits of a strong retail deposit franchise since **deposit spreads** have collapsed (see Chart 12). Banks simply do not make any money from holding our deposits anymore and using that to cross-subsidise other products (eg transaction/current accounts) is not a realistic long-term strategy but that does not mean they make no money from **lending** to us.

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**Chart 11: Danske fees/revenues vs interest rates**



Source: Danmarks Nationalbank & Danske Bank, September 2019.

**Chart 12: Benefit from deposits has collapsed**



Source: Barclays, 25 February 2019.

The critical current concern is that with loan demand being weak, banks are being forced to park their surplus liquidity (loan/deposit ratios are low by historic standards) in very low-earning and even negative-rate securities. We suspect the current pressure on margins is being driven mostly by this issue rather than lending spreads. Deposit spreads collapsed many years ago. Furthermore, the shape of the curve also impacts bank earnings with sensitivity to changes reflecting the structure of a balance sheet. Banks with longer duration assets (commercial real estate, residential mortgages linked to long-term rates) and large security portfolios are more affected by lower, long-term rates and a flatter curve as the spread between their lending and borrowing rates declines. In general, US large-cap banks are more sensitive to changes in short rates while the extent to which small and mid-sized banks are affected depends on their loan weighting to commercial real estate. Added to this, banks have various means to mitigate the impact of movements in interest rates including collars or hedging strategies.

Equally, should interest rates fall then the burden of repayments will also reduce and so the severity of defaults could fall (albeit with a lag – see Chart 14 on non-performing loans). The recent financial crisis is a good example, where the rapid cuts in interest rates helped keep the overall level of non-performing loans at lower levels than would have been expected. **Some brokers are implying that better than expected asset quality could offset 30% of the pressure from margins.** Margins should also be looked at in the context of what types of loans banks are writing and margins, adjusted for the level of provisions, remain in line with the long-term average (Chart 13).

**Chart 13: US risk adjusted margin - what's the fuss?**


Source: KBW, 25 March 2019.


**Chart 14: US bank NPLs vs US interest rates**


Source: Bloomberg & Polar Capital, 26 September 2019.

Banks have other levers to offset the pressure on margins. A reduced benefit from retail deposit gathering raises the potential to cut network costs – in our experience those countries which have had low interest rates for long periods of time also tend to have low cost/asset ratios (see Chart 15), although we accept lower costs do not necessarily offset the impact of lower rates. Revenues could be boosted from increasing fee income (see earlier comments on Swiss and Danish banks) and Chart 11.


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**Chart 15: Lower margins usually means lower costs...**



Source: KBW, 25 March 2019.

**Chart 16: US & European loan growth (Y/Y)**




Source: Polar Capital, September 2019.

Not all pressures ahead are equal. Our greatest concern remains certain southern European markets which are more exposed to spread pressure given the shorter duration of their loan books and therefore faster repricing (Spanish banks' mortgages reprice on a one-year cycle compared to more than five years for Dutch banks). Japanese banks have faced a zero interest rate environment since 1999 and suffered from excess liquidity (loan/deposit ratio 62%) as well as low non-interest income (15% of gross operating profits, average between 2011-2017, versus a eurozone figure of 45%) and a balance sheet structure with significant weighting to securities and cash (40% of total versus 20% in Europe). Within the US, mid and small-sized banks are more exposed to this pressure since their fee incomes are less evolved and economies of scale can be smaller, although this is offset by their bias to less price-sensitive segments such as SME lending.

### Banks are financially stronger with better quality assets today


Worries about a recession are perfectly valid – the last time there was a downturn numerous banks had to be recapitalised by their respective governments (although we would argue this was more to do with lax capital and liquidity regulations rather than the severity of bad debt experience). They remain a cyclical business and currently loan loss provisioning is at very low levels implying it can only go upwards. What is often ignored is that there has been very little loan growth ahead of this possible downturn (Chart 16) and this usually limits the extent of deterioration in asset quality (Chart 17). However, valuations are expecting a very material further deterioration (Chart 18).

**Chart 17: Implied peak provisioning for next downturn**



Source: Autonomous Research, 3 January 2019.

**Chart 18: Implied provision increase for fair value\***



Source: Polar Capital & Bloomberg consensus estimates, September 2019.


\*Note: The implied increase in loan loss provisioning versus FY19 consensus estimates to reach Polar Capital fair value.

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Further, since the global financial crisis, the regulatory environment has been much tougher, and continues to be monitored through stress tests and so more risky lending has generally shifted to the bond market and private loan markets (Chart 20). Also, the US consumer has de-gearred ahead of any possible downturn (Chart 19).

**Chart 19: US household leverage**


Source: Federal Reserve, 20 September 2019.

**Chart 20: Corporate securities vs corporate loans**


Source: SIFMA & Federal Reserve, 24 August 2018.

## Structural change is happening and is needed

The low-rate environment is raising structural challenges for the banks and they are responding to those challenges, albeit slowly. We remain baffled by the overly negative tone surrounding the sector (strong balance sheets, high dividend yields, low valuations are all completely ignored) and believe the structural change is often misunderstood. The growth in digitisation is both a benefit and a threat to the sector and our experience of this is that the benefits are only now beginning to be recognised, through lower costs, but the negatives of disruption make better headlines. Equally, the collapse in deposit spreads is easily understood but there is little acceptance that this has meant greater disintermediation ahead. This is particularly true for banking markets in Europe and Japan with large stocks of on-balance sheet, low-rate mortgages and large corporate lending with onerous capital requirements.

Though we accept the deposit-driven model of banking is being reassessed, we would warn that we have been here before and history is littered with failed banks that did not focus on the stability of funding provided by deposits. Deposit margins have collapsed and banks need to start charging for their services rather than relying on the benefit of the float left in customers' bank accounts. This is beginning to happen for larger deposits, but most banks remain wary of being a first mover and introducing fees since they may lose much of their customer base. Equally, we keep our deposits with banks since they are regulated and most countries have deposit guarantee systems in place for added reassurance. Eventually interest rates will rise so the benefit will flow through again with deposit-rich banks being greater beneficiaries.


The trend to banking becoming less capital intensive and balance sheet-driven will accelerate should interest rates remain low. Banks will become arrangers and facilitators in many areas, while holding on to their more lucrative consumer and SME lending. This will necessitate a shift to a more volume-driven approach which has implications for cultures and valuations – interestingly in financial services, the volume-driven models often trade on higher valuations than those which are more capital intensive/balance sheet driven.

## Do not forget you are being paid to wait

Finally, do not forget that investing in this sector also comes with the added benefit of high yields. Loan-loss provisions will rise, but this is more likely to hit earnings rather than book value so protecting dividends which are driven by the high capital levels and low balance sheet growth. While you wait for rates to rise you could also enjoy the highest yields in the market.


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**Chart 21: US total yields - sector breakdown**



Source: Barclays Research, 16 May 2019.

**Chart 22: 2019 Total bank yields**



Source: Bloomberg, 27 September 2019.

**Polar Capital Financials Team**

29 October 2019

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